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Abstract
We provide evidence that Federal Reserve’s money supply can be characterized
by a simple rule, whereby the growth rate of nonborrowed reserves depends on
expected in‡ation. The Volcker-Greenspan era is found to be associated with
a negative in‡ation elasticity, whereas our estimates indicate that the Federal
Reserve in the pre-1980 era supplied money in an accommodating way. While
these results appear to be consistent with empirical evidence on interest rate
rules, our theoretical analysis gives rise to novel insights. Applying a New
Keynesian model, money supply rules are shown to ensure saddle path stabil-
ity, indicating that they do not allow for self-ful…lling expectations. Further,
o p t i m a lm o n e t a r yp o l i c yc a nb ei m p l e m e n t e db yam o n e ys u p p l yr u l ew i t ha
negative in‡ation elasticity, implying that the pre-1980 regime was less e¢cient
in dampening macroeconomic ‡uctuations. On the transmission of money sup-
ply shocks, we show that a negative in‡ation elasticity raises the likelihood of
a liquidity e¤ect and lowers the persistence of the output response.
JEL classi…cation: E52, E32.
Keywords: Money supply, policy rule estimations, optimal monetary policy,
saddle path stability, liquidity e¤ect, output persistence.
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Central bank policy is often summarized by supplying money according to a constant money
growth rate. While this policy regime can be justi…ed on theoretical grounds, e.g., by the
so-called Friedman rule, in reality central banks have hardly taken this strategy literally.
Though, some central banks have claimed to target a constant money growth rate, recent
empirical contributions provide evidence that monetary policy can often be reasonably sum-
marized by simple rules, whereby a short-run nominal interest rate is set contingent on
macroeconomic variables (see, e.g. Clarida et al., 1999, 2000). Given that the short-run
nominal interest rate generally serves as an operating target rather than an exogenous pol-
icy instrument, central bank policy might alternatively be described by a contingent rule,
according to which high-powered money is supplied in open market operations. While em-
pirical contributions to the monetary policy literature have repeatedly emphasized that the
supply of narrow monetary aggregates, i.e., nonborrowed reserves, rather than the federal
funds rate can actually be controlled by the central bank (see, e.g., Eichenbaum, 1992, or
Strongin, 1995), the implied reaction function has not yet been taken into consideration in
empirical and theoretical contributions to business cycle analysis. In this paper it is shown
that contingency of money supply rules contributes to some issues therein, in particular,
to the alleged instability of monetary business cycle models, the implementation of optimal
monetary policy and monetary transmission.
This paper extends the line of research on monetary policy rules, which, since Taylor
(1993), primarily has focussed on rules for a short-run nominal interest rate. We provide
evidence that the Federal Reserve policy can be summarized by the growth rate of nonbor-
rowed reserves being set contingent on realizations of the in‡ation rate. In particular, we
…nd that the in‡ation elasticity of the growth rate of nonborrowed reserves is signi…cantly
negative during the Volcker-Greenspan era, indicating a monetary policy regime that aims at
stabilizing the rate of in‡ation. On the contrary, the in‡ation elasticity in the pre-Volcker era
is estimated to be slightly positive, implying an accommodating money supply regime. While
these results are consistent with broad empirical evidence on the shift in Federal Reserve pol-
icy, our theoretical analysis of money supply rules further suggests that the high and volatile
in‡ation rates in the pre-Volcker era were primarily due to the Federal Reserve’s ine¢cacy to
mitigate macroeconomic ‡uctuations triggered by fundamental shocks (as opposed to non-
fundamental shocks). Conversely, Clarida et al. (2000) claim that the particular interest
rate setting substantially contributed to the high in‡ation volatility in the pre-Volcker era by
2allowing for expectations to become self-ful…lling.4 By considering an alternative monetary
policy instrument, i.e., nonborrowed reserves, our results indicate that the latter conclusion
mainly relies on the application of simple interest rate rules, which are known to easily allow
for indeterminacy of prices and real macroeconomic aggregates (see Kerr and King, 1996;
Benhabib et al., 2001, or Carlstrom and Fuerst, 2001).
For the theoretical analysis we apply a conventional New Keynesian model, which allows
for an analytical treatment and facilitates comparisons with related studies on interest rate
rules. It is shown that the money supply rules of interest are associated with saddle stable
equilibrium paths and, therefore, exclude multiple or unstable equilibria. This implies that,
although, Federal Reserve money supply was accommodating in the pre-Volcker era, it did
not allow for self-ful…lling expectations. We then proceed by assessing money supply rules
with regard to their ability to stabilize fundamental business cycle ‡uctuations. In particular,
we derive a central bank loss function, which penalizes output and in‡ation volatility, based
on a second order approximation of households’ welfare (see Woodford, 2002). Given the
characterization of the optimal monetary policy under commitment, it is shown that a simple
money supply rule with an negative in‡ation elasticity is in fact able to implement the optimal
allocation.5 It can therefore be concluded that the money supply regime of the Volcker-
Greenspan era has been successful in stabilizing macroeconomic ‡uctuations, whereas the
Federal Reserve policy in the pre-Volcker era was apparently less e¢cient, giving rise to
higher macroeconomic volatility due to an accommodating money supply regime.
Regarding the transmission of money supply shocks, we examine if the departure from
a Friedman-style constant money growth rule matters for the short-run e¤ects of monetary
policy shocks. In particular, we focus on two issues which are extensively discussed in the
literature on the transmission of monetary injections, namely, the liquidity e¤ect and the
persistence of output responses (see, e.g., Chari et al., 2000). The liquidity e¤ect, although,
repeatedly found in the data (see, e.g., Hamilton, 1997), can hardly be produced in sticky
price models (see Christiano et al. 1997, or Andres et al., 2002), having led to the notion
of the ’liquidity puzzle’. We show that smaller (negative) values for the in‡ation elasticity
raise the likelihood for a liquidity e¤ect to occur. We additionally …nd that the persistence
of output response to a monetary policy shock relies on the central bank’s reactiveness, in
that a higher in‡ation elasticity slows down the recovery of output in response to a monetary
injection.
4According to this view, the economy evolves according to a non-fundamental solution for the rational
expectations equilibrium, where sunspot shocks are able to alter macroeconomic aggregates.
5To be more precise, the latter actually matches the so-called targeting rule for the optimal monetary
policy. See Svensson (2003) for a comprehensive discussion and comparison of targeting and instrument rules.
3The remainder of the paper is set out as follows. Section 2 provides empirical evidence
on simple money supply rules. In Section 3 we develop a simple sticky price model, which
facilitates an analytical assessment of money supply rules. Section 4 presents the analysis of
the model’s local dynamics and provides a welfare analysis of money supply rules. Section
5 examines the transmission of money supply shocks and relates the contingency of money
supply to the likelihood of a liquidity e¤ect and the degree of output persistence. Section 6
concludes.
2 Empirical Evidence
It is commonly agreed that the Federal Reserve adopted a more well managed and proactive
stance after Volcker’s appointment as Fed Chairman (see, e.g., Friedman and Kuttner, 1996;
Taylor, 1998; or Clarida et al., 2000). For example, Clarida et al. (2000), estimating a
forward-looking Taylor rule, provide evidence for a strong anti-in‡ationary stance during
the Volcker-Greenspan period. Conversely, they …nd monetary policy in the 20 years prior
V o l c k e rt ob em o r ea c c o m m o d a t i v e . 6 The objective of the present empirical section is to





½i¹t¡i + ®Et f¼t+ng + "t; (1)
where ¹t denotes the growth rate of a monetary aggregate, Etf¼t+ng is the expected in‡ation
rate in t+n; and the error term "t is assumed to be independently and identically distributed
(iid) Gaussian. In accordance with the view that a central bank essentially controls the sup-
ply of high powered money (rather than the short-run nominal interest rate), ¹t denotes the
growth rate of nonborrowed reserves. This choice is consistent with the approach in several
contributions to the literature on monetary transmission, where monetary policy shocks are
identi…ed with innovations to nonborrowed reserves (see Eichenbaum, 1992; Strongin, 1995;
Hamilton, 1997; or Christiano et al., 1999). By specifying the growth rate of nonborrowed
reserves as in (1), we aim at disclosing the structural dependence between the supply of re-
serves and the growth rate of an aggregate price level.7 In addition to lagged growth rates
of nonborrowed reserves, the monetary policy rule (1) includes a forward looking compo-
nent, allowing money supply to be related to expected future in‡ation. This formulation
corresponds to variants of the Taylor (1993) rule, in which the federal funds rate responds
6Accommodating in the sense that on average the Federal Reserve let real short term interest rates decline
as anticipated in‡ation rose.
7It should be noted that we do not presume the Federal Reserve to follow a speci…c target for the growth
rate of nonborrowed reserves.
4to expected movements in in‡ation, re‡ecting the aim of Federal Reserve policy to stabilize
future in‡ation rates. The above equation is the basic building block of the empirical analysis
and serves as the main novelty of the theoretical analysis in the subsequent sections.
We apply the aforementioned money supply rule to di¤erent episodes of Federal Reserve
policy. The data are obtained from a database provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis and are of monthly frequency.8 As has been highlighted in several studies, monetary
policy was allegedly less well managed in the twenty years prior to Volcker. Hence, the …rst
period we examine, covers the time horizon January 1960 to September 1979 and is referred
to as the pre-Volcker era. We further explore monetary policy in the Volcker-Greenspan era
(January 1983 to January 2003).9 We expect substantial di¤erences in the estimated policy
rule across the two periods. In particular, the response to the forward-looking component, as
measured by the coe¢cient ®; is expected to di¤er across time. Monetary policy is considered
reactive for ®<0, implying that higher expected in‡ation leads to lower money supply.
Conversely, a money supply rule characterized by ® ¸ 0 is seen as accommodating.
We estimate our money supply rule with two in‡ation measures - consumer price in-
‡ation and producer price in‡ation (for all commodities). While the former serves as a
more comprehensive price measure, we alternatively consider the latter price index as an
early indicator of a nascent rise in aggregate prices. The in‡ation rate and the growth rate
of nonborrowed reserves are constructed as year-on-year percentage changes. Figure 1 dis-
plays the growth rate of nonborrowed reserves together with consumer price in‡ation for the
Volcker-Greenspan period. The inverse relationship between both variables is evident and
appears to hold throughout key phases of the sample period.10 This back-of-the-envelope
evidence suggests that in‡ation is negatively related to nonborrowed reserves growth during
the Volcker-Greenspan period. It is complemented in the following by estimating the money
supply rule (1) using generalized methods of moments (GMM).11
The starting point of any GMM estimation is a theoretical relation that the parameters
should satisfy, which is described by orthogonality conditions between some function of the
8This database is known as Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED).
9Although Volcker was appointed Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System in
1979, we refrain from including the …rst three years of his mandate in the sample period because this might lead
to biased estimates for the Volcker-Greenspan period (see Clarida et al. 2000). Indeed, for a brief period at the
start of the Volcker era, the Fed seemed to pursue a policy of nonborrowed reserves targeting (see Goodfriend,
1991). In addition, the period until the end of 1982 is usually regarded as the ‘Volcker disin‡ation’ episode, in
which in‡ation was brought down to 4 percent from previously 10 percent in 1980. This was an exceptional
period as in‡ation thereafter was steadily more stable.
10This …nding also holds if one considers producer price in‡ation.
11GMM is now a widely used technique to estimate monetary policy rules. Clarida et al. (2000), for example,
apply GMM to estimate a forward looking Taylor rule.
5parameters f (µ) and a set of instrumental variables zt:
Et (f (µ)zt)=0 ; (2)
where µ are the parameters to be estimated. Let f (µ)=¹t ¡
m P
i=1
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The GMM estimator selects parameter estimates such that the sample correlation between
function f a n dt h ei n s t r u m e n t si sc l o s et oz e r o . 12 For each estimation our vector of instru-
ments includes 6 lags of in‡ation and 6 lags of nonborrowed reserves. Since not all current
information may be available to the public at the time they form expectations, contemporary
variables are not used as instruments.
Table 1 summarizes the results for the pre-Volcker period. Notably, the estimated coe¢-
cient ® on the in‡ation rate is signi…cantly positive suggesting that monetary policy during
the pre-Volcker period was accommodating - higher expected in‡ation led to a mild increase
in the money supply. Similar …ndings are obtained when the estimations are carried out using
producer price in‡ation. In the baseline case the monetary policy rule is estimated using a
forward-looking horizon for in‡ation of 1 month, that is n =1 : Alternatively, we allow for
di¤erent target horizons, i.e., 3 and 6 months. Note, however, that the impulse of the forward
looking component on the growth rate of the monetary aggregate remains unchanged even at
di¤erent target horizons. The growth rate of nonborrowed reserves enters the money supply
rule with a lag length of three. We only report the sum of the estimated autoregressive
coe¢cients, which is found to be positive and less than unity in each case.
Next we estimate a similar money supply rule using data for the Volcker-Greenspan period.
The growth rate of nonborrowed reserves enters the monetary policy rule with a lag of three.
The most striking result discovered for the Volcker-Greenspan period concerns the in‡ation
elasticity, which is now found to be signi…cantly negative at all in‡ation target horizons (see
Table 2), suggesting that monetary policy as measured by a simple contingent money supply
rule appeared to be more reactive during the investigated period. This …nding con…rms earlier
results reported by Clarida et al. (2000) who associate the Volcker-Greenspan era with a more
aggressive monetary policy regime. It should be noted that the long-run in‡ation elasticity
de…ned as ¹¼ ´ ®=(1 ¡ §½i) is strictly smaller than unity for all speci…cations.
12The parameter estimates are obtained using a criterion function, that is of the following nature: J (µ)=
(f (µ)z)
0 W (f (µ)z),w h e r eW is a weighting matrix.
6Table 1. GMM Estimation Results: Pre-Volcker Period
Estimated Money Supply Rule: ¹t =§ 3
i=1½i¹t¡i + ®Et f¼t+ng + "t
CPI PPI
n =1 n =3 n =6 n =1 n =3 n =6













R2 0:85 0:85 0:85 0:85 0:85 0:84
J 0:32 0:32 0:35 0:17 0:18 0:19
AR(3) 0:23 0:21 0:19 0:10 0:08 0:05
AR(6) 0:48 0:45 0:43 0:25 0:21 0:16
ARCH(3) 0:35 0:37 0:39 0:25 0:26 0:32
ARCH(6) 0:60 0:64 0:67 0:50 0:53 0:63
Notes: Figures in parentheses below coe¢cient estimates denote p-values. R2 denotes
the coe¢cient of determination; J is a test statistic for the null hypothesis that the overi-
dentifying restrictions are satis…ed; AR(j) is a Lagrange multiplier test statistic for up
to jth-order serial correlation in the residuals, ARCH(j) is a Lagrange multiplier test
statistic for up to jth-order autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity in the residuals.
For J, AR(j) and ARCH(j) we only report p-values. Note that coe¢cient estimates of
the autoregressive components are statistically signi…cant. The associated p-values are not
reported here but are available from the authors upon request.
In general, the goodness-of-…t statistics are satisfactory for both subperiods, with the coef-
…cient of determination ranging from 0.62 for the Volcker-Greenspan period to 0.85 for the
pre-Volcker era. We also carry out a number of diagnostic tests. We …rst compute Hansen’s
J-statistic to test the validity of overidentifying restrictions. In each case the null hypothe-
sis that overidentifying restrictions are satis…ed could not be rejected. Standard diagnostic
tests generally indicate no evidence of serial correlation and autoregressive conditional het-
eroskedasticity in the residuals, suggesting that the residuals are well behaved.13
13We did carry out GMM estimations that consider di¤erent model speci…cations. In particular, we allowed
alterantive lag speci…cation and for contemporary variables in the vector of instruments. Our estimates,
although qualitatively similar to the ones just reported, were not found to be statistically signi…cant and the
resulting diagnostic tests often indicated possible misspeci…cation of the estimated models.
7Table 2. GMM Estimation Results: Volcker-Greenspan Period
Estimated Money Supply Rule: ¹t = ½¹t¡3 + ®Et f¼t+ng + "t
CPI PPI
n =1 n =3 n =6 n =1 n =3 n =6













R2 0:62 0:62 0:64 0:64 0:64 0:66
J 0:17 0:17 0:23 0:35 0:36 0:22
AR(3) 0:12 0:18 0:36 0:28 0:42 0:55
AR(6) 0:30 0:39 0:57 0:52 0:52 0:58
ARCH(3) 0:36 0:30 0:18 0:10 0:07 0:08
ARCH(6) 0:28 0:23 0:15 0:11 0:10 0:12
Notes: See notes to Table 1.
Overall, the empirical analysis provides evidence for the supply of nonborrowed reserves to
react to expected in‡ation during the past four decades of Federal Reserve policy. The
empirical results demonstrate that monetary policy during the Volcker-Greenspan era had
indeed a proactive stance towards targeting in‡ation. Our …ndings thus seem to be consistent
with the results in Clarida et al. (2000) who characterize the Volcker-Greenspan era as a
highly sensitive monetary policy regime. Conversely, in the pre-Volcker period, supply of
nominal balances appeared to be mildly accommodating, lending support to the view that
the anti-in‡ationary stance of the Fed was weaker during that period. In any case, the Fed has
controlled real balances not to rise with the expected in‡ation rate as the long-run in‡ation
elasticity ¹¼ ´ ®=(1 ¡ §½i) was estimated never to exceed one. As will be shown in the
theoretical analysis, a money supply regime is in fact destabilizing only if ¹¼ > 1, implying
that the central bank raises the growth rate of real balances when in‡ation rises.
3 A sticky price model
In this section we develop a New Keynesian model where the central bank sets the growth
rate of money. We abstract from specifying di¤erent monetary aggregates for convenience,
implicitly assuming that money multipliers are constant.14
14Interest rate policy, on the other hand, implies the real Federal Funds Rate.to govern consumption growth.
8Households Throughout the paper nominal (real) variables are denoted by upper-case
(lower-case) letters. There is a continuum of households indexed with j 2 (0;1). They are
identical except for their idiosyncratic working time lj, which is monopolistically supplied to
…rms. Hence, the indexation of households’ variables with j can be omitted except for labor












,a n d ¾, #>0; (4)
where c denotes consumption, ¯ the subjective discount factor (0 <¯<1), and E0 the
expectation operator conditional on the information in period 0. At the beginning of each
period households are endowed with money Mt¡1 and risk-free government bonds Bt¡1.B e -
fore households enter the goods market in period t, they are not able to adjust their asset
holdings such that they rely on their predetermined asset holdings Mt¡1 and Bt¡1. House-
holds are assumed to hold checkable accounts at a …nancial intermediary. After goods are
produced labor income is credited on this account, while it is charged for wage outlays of …rms
which are owned by the households. Entering the goods market, consumption expenditures
are therefore restricted by the following liquidity constraint:








where wj(w) denotes the idiosyncratic (aggregate) real wage rate and ¿t denotes lump sum
transfers. The conventional cash-in-advance constraint is augmented by allowing for net wage
earnings, i.e., the term in round brackets in (5), to be accepted as a means of payment. Hence,
an individual labor income, which exceeds the average wage payments of …nal goods producing
…rms indexed with i 2 (0;1) employing li, leads to an relaxation of the cash constraint (5).
This assumption, which is adopted from Jeanne (1998), is introduced to avoid the cash-credit
good distortion between consumption and leisure. It further facilitates a comparison with
related studies as the model’s reduced form representation will be isomorphic to the standard
New Keynesian model (see, e.g., Clarida et al., 1999, or Galí et al. 2001).15 Obviously, we
obtain a standard cash-in-advance speci…cation in equilibrium.
We assume that households monopolistically supply di¤erentiated labor services as in
Clarida et al. (2002). The di¤erentiated labor services lj are transformed into one type of
labor input l,w h i c hc a nb ee m p l o y e df o rt h ep r o d u c t i o no ft h e… n a lg o o d . T h et r a n s f o r -






jt dj,w i t h´t > 1.T h e e l a s t i c i t y
15Otherwise, the nominal interest rate would enter the aggregate ressource contraint (the ’New Keynesian
Phillips curve’). However, the local stability properties remain unchanged (see Schabert, 2003).
9of substitution between di¤erentiated labor services ´t is allowed to vary exogenously over
time,16 leading to changes in the labor market conditions which a¤ects the costs of …nal goods
producing …rms. Cost minimization with respect to di¤erentiated labor services then leads














where l denotes aggregate labor services. The households own …nal goods producing …rms
and, thus, receive their pro…ts !t. Moreover, they receive wage payments and the government
transfer. The budget constraint of household j is given by
Ptct + Bt + Mt · RtBt¡1 + Mt¡1 + Ptwjtljt + Pt¿t + Pt!t; (7)
where Rt denotes the gross nominal interest rate on government bonds.17 Maximizing the
objective (4) subject to the cash-in-advance constraint (5), the budget constraint (7), labor
demand (6) and a no-Ponzi-game condition, limi!1 Et[(Bt+i + Mt+i)¦ i
v=1Rt+v
¡1] ¸ 0,f o r
given initial values B0 and M0 leads to the following …rst order conditions:
c¡¾
t =¸t + Ãt;l #






















t + wjtljt ¡ wt
Z 1
0
litdi ¡ ct + ¿t
¸
=0 ; (10)
and (5), where 't =
´t
´t¡1 denotes the markup over the perfectly competitive real wage, ¸
the shadow price of wealth, Ã the Lagrange multiplier on the cash-in-advance constraint,
mt ´ Mt=Pt real balances, and ¼t ´ Pt=Pt¡1 the in‡ation rate. Furthermore, the budget





¸t+i¯t+i (bt+i + mt+i)
¤
=0 ; (11)
where bt ´ Bt=Pt. Note that the cash constraint (5) avoids a cash-credit distortion between
consumption and leisure such that the consumption/leisure decision satis…es c¾
t l#
t = wjt='t.
We further assume that the ’cost push’ shocks are generated by: 't = '1¡½''
½'
t exp("'t),
where '>1 and "'t are i.i.d. with Et¡1"'t =0 .
16For example, a decline in ´t leads to an exogenous increase in the competitiveness reducing the market
power of the supply side.
17Thus, households have access to nominal state contingent debt.
10Production Sector The …nal consumption good is an aggregate of di¤erentiated goods
produced by monopolistically competitive …rms indexed with i 2 (0;1). The CES aggregator








it di; with ²>1; (12)
where y is the number of units of the …nal good, yi the amount produced by …rm i,a n d
² the constant elasticity of substitution between these di¤erentiated goods. Let Pi and P
denote the price of good i set by …rm i and the price index for the …nal good. The demand
for each di¤erentiated good is derived by minimizing the total costs of obtaining y : yit =
(Pit=Pt)




it di.A… r mi produces good yi employing a technology
which is linear in the labor: yit = lit. We introduce a nominal stickiness in form of staggered
price setting as developed by Calvo (1983) and Yun (1996). Each period …rms may reset
their prices with the probability 1 ¡ Á independent of the time elapsed since the last price
setting. The fraction Á of …rms are assumed to adjust their previous period’s prices according
to Pit = ¼Pit¡1; where ¼ denotes the average in‡ation rate. The linear approximation to the
corresponding aggregate supply constraint at the steady state, given by
b ¼t = Âc mct + ¯Etb ¼t+1; with Â =( 1¡ Á)(1¡ ¯Á)Á¡1 > 0; (13)
can be found in Yun (1996). Note that b x denotes the percent deviation from the steady state
value x of a generic variable x, b x =l o g ( xt) ¡ log(x),a n dmc the real marginal costs. The
demand for aggregate labor input in a symmetric equilibrium relates the real marginal costs
to the real wage:
mct = wt: (14)
Public Sector The public sector consists of a monetary and a …scal authority. The latter
is assumed to issue one-period bonds, earning the net interest (Rt¡1)Bt¡1,w h i l et h ef o r m e r
issues money. The consolidated ‡ow budget constraint of the public sector is given by Bt +
Mt = RtBt¡1 + Mt¡1 + Pt¿t. The public sector is assumed to satisfy: limi!1(Bt+i +
Mt+i)Et+i¦i
v=1 (1 + it+v)
¡1 =0 . This speci…cation of the solvency constraint, which includes
all government labilities, is taken from Benhabib et al. (2001) and characterizes a Ricardian
policy regime. As government bonds are irrelevant for the focus of this paper, we assume
that they are issued at a net supply equal to zero.18
18In fact, this prevents bonds to enter the consolidated cash constraint, which could alternatively be avoided
by assuming that only seignorage, Pt¿
s
t = Mt ¡ Mt¡1, is transferred in form of cash, such that Pt¿
s
t instead
of Pt¿t enters the right hand side of (5).
11The central bank controls the money growth rate according to the following simple rule
¹t ´ Mt=Mt¡1 = ¹(¼t;" t);¹ t ¸ 1,( 1 5 )
where the innovation " has an expected value of zero and is serially uncorrelated. It should
be noted that the money growth rule in (15) is speci…ed in a simpler way than the rule
estimated in section 2. For example, the in‡ation rate ¼t does not enter the policy rule in
form of its expected value, as the central bank is assumed to be able to adjust money supply
a f t e ra g g r e g a t es h o c k sa r er e a l i z e d .I nf a c t ,t h em a i nr e s u l t sd e r i v e di nt h er e m a i n d e ro ft h e
paper will be demonstrated to be robust when the current period in‡ation rate is replaced by
the expected future in‡ation rate. Generalizing the case of a constant money growth policy
(@¹t=@¼t =0 ), which can be found in the majority of studies applying money growth rules,
we allow the growth rate ¹t to depend on the realization of the in‡ation rate. A similar
money growth rule featuring (lagged) in‡ation rates can, for example, be found in McCallum
(1999). Though, we allow the money growth rate to vary in the short-run, we certainly ensure
that it is constant in the long-run equilibrium. We assume that the condition ¹(¼;0) = ¼ has
a solution for a steady state in‡ation rate such that the steady state nominal interest rate,
satisfying R = ¼=¯ > 1, is strictly larger than zero. We further restrict the realizations of "
(and of "') to be su¢ciently small, such that the gross interest rate always exceeds one in
the neighborhood of this steady state.
The rational expectations equilibrium of the model with Rt > 1 is a set of sequences f¼t;
wt;m t¡1;¸ t;Ã t;R t;c t;l t;m c t;b tg1
t=0 satisfying (i) the household’s …rst order conditions (8)-
(9) together with the consolidated cash constraint, ct = mt, (ii) the optimal pricing condition
approximated by (13) and the aggregate labor demand (14); (iii) the money growth rule (15)
and a net bond supply of zero (bt =0 ); (iv), the aggregate resource constraint, lt = ct,a n d
the transversality condition of the households (11) for given initial values of the nominal
money stock M0 and the aggregate price level P0.
4 Stability and welfare properties
In general, money growth rules di¤er from Taylor-type interest rate rules with regard to
the determinacy properties (see Carlstrom and Fuerst, 2003) and the implied fundamental
solution of rational expectations (or perfect foresight) models (see Schabert, 2003). In this
section we assess the stability and welfare implications of contingent money supply rules,
applying methods, which are commonly used for the analysis of interest rate rules (see, e.g.,
Clarida et al., 1999, or Giannoni and Woodford, 2002). Given that a log-linear approximation
of our model delivers – except for the policy rule – the standard New Keynesian model, we
12can immediately compare our …ndings with existing results on interest rate rules. Before
we examine the welfare implications of contingent money supply rules, we …rst derive the
conditions for saddle path stability. Hereby, it is shown that a central bank can implement
the optimal allocation under commitment by applying a simple money supply rule.
The linearized model In the remainder of this paper we restrict our attention to cases
where the nominal interest rate is always strictly larger than one, Rt > 1, such that the
cash-in-advance constraint always binds. We focus on the properties of the model at a target
s t e a d ys t a t ew i t ha ni n ‡ a t i o nr a t e¼ : ¼ ¸ ¯.19 The model is then log-linearized at the
steady state and reduced, such that output, the in‡ation rate, real balances and the nominal
interest rate remain to be determined. The log-linear version of the money growth rule is
given by: b mt ¡ b mt¡1 + b ¼t = ¹¼b ¼t +"t. Its non-linear representation might, for example, take
the form: ¹(¼t;" t)=·¹¼
¹¼
t exp("t), where the parameter ·¹ is calibrated contingent on the
realizations of the in‡ation elasticity ¹¼ to match the steady state condition for a particular
steady state in‡ation rate ¼ : ·¹ = ¼1¡¹¼. A rational expectations equilibrium of the linear
model is de…ned as follows.
De…nition 1 A rational expectations equilibrium of the linear approximation to the model
at the steady state with Rt > 1 is a set of sequences fb ¼t; b mt = b yt; b Rtg1
t=0 satisfying
b ¼t =!b mt + ¯Etb ¼t+1 + Âb 't; with b 't = ½'b 't¡1 + "'t and ! ´ Â(# + ¾) > 0; (16)
b mt = b mt¡1 +( ¹¼ ¡ 1)b ¼t + "t; (17)
¾b mt =¾Etb mt+1 ¡ b Rt + Etb ¼t+1: (18)
and (11) given sequences of shocks f"t;" 'tg1
t=0 and an initial value m0 = M0=P0.
The …rst equilibrium condition (16) in de…nition 1 is derived from the aggregate supply curve,
while the second condition (17) is the monetary policy rule. Equation (18) is the consumption
Euler equation, where consumption is replaced by real balances using the cash-constraint.
This equation residually determines the equilibrium sequence of the nominal interest rate for
given sequences of in‡ation and real balances. Replacing the money supply rule (17) by an
interest rate rule and using b yt = b mt delivers Clarida et al.’s (2000) model.
Requirements for local determinacy As can be seen from the conditions in de…nition
1, past realizations of real balances always enter the set of equilibrium conditions such that
the model exhibits one predetermined, b mt¡1, and one jump variable, b ¼t. It turns out that
existence and uniqueness of a stable rational expectations equilibrium, which requires – ac-
cording to Blanchard and Kahn (1980) – one stable and one unstable eigenvalue, depends on




"' ; m = c,a n d¼ = ¹(¼;0) = ¯R.
13the value for the in‡ation elasticity ¹¼. The following proposition presents the conditions for
saddle path stability.
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium determinacy) If the central bank sets the money growth
rate such that ¹¼ < 1, then the model is saddle path stable.
Proof. To examine the local dynamics, we rewrite the model given in de…nition 1 in matrix
























1 ¹¼ ¡ 1
!
.
As the model exhibits one endogenous state variable (b mt¡1), we want to derive the conditions
for the case where exactly one eigenvalue lies inside the unit circle, such that the model is sad-
dlepoint stable and the state variable exhibits a positive autocorrelation. The characteristic
polynomial of (M0)
¡1 M1 then reads
f(X)=X2 ¡ (¯ ¡ !¹¼ + ! +1 )¯¡1X +1 =¯: (19)
Given that f(0) is equal to 1=¯ and, therefore, strictly positive and f(1) = !(¹¼ ¡ 1)=¯ is
strictly negative for ¹¼ < 1, the model exhibits one stable and one unstable eigenvalue, i.e.,
0 <X 1 < 1 and 1 <X 2,i f¹¼ < 1, which establishes the claim made in the proposition. ¥
According to proposition 1, a constant money growth policy (¹¼ =0 ) ensures a uniquely
determined stable equilibrium path. When money supply is, however, allowed to depend on
the realizations of the in‡ation rate, saddle path stability is ensured as long as the elasticity ¹¼
is smaller than one. Otherwise, the central bank gives rise to multiple or unstable equilibrium
paths. Whether the in‡ation elasticity ¹¼ i ss m a l l e ro rl a r g e rt h a no n ei sd e c i s i v ef o rh i g h e r
in‡ation rates leading either to a decline or to a rise in real balances. Suppose, for example,
that a cost push shock leads to a rise in in‡ation, which reduces the real value of money
for ¹¼ < 1. In this case, aggregate demand declines bringing in‡ation back to its steady
state value. Otherwise, ¹¼ > 1 causes real balances and, thus, aggregate demand to grow,
which further leads to an upward pressure on prices. Hence, a money supply rule must be
accompanied by an in‡ation elasticity smaller than one to avoid explosiveness and to ensure
the economy to evolve on a saddle stable equilibrium path. In contrast, a simple interest
rate rule, b Rt = ½¼b ¼t, has to feature a value for an in‡ation elasticity which is larger than one
(½¼ > 1) in order to rule out multiple equilibria in our model (see, e.g., Woodford, 2001).
Moreover, the determinacy condition for an interest rate rule easily changes when the central
bank responds to expected in‡ation, b Rt = ½¼Etb ¼t+1, rather than to the current in‡ation rate
14(see Carlstrom and Fuerst, 2001, or Svensson and Woodford, 2003). On the contrary, the
condition for saddle path stability remains unchanged (¹¼ < 1) when the money supply rule
features the expected future in‡ation rate, b ¹t = ¹¼Etb ¼t+1, as for example assumed in Section
2. The stability analysis for the latter rule is provided in appendix 8.1.
Now recall that the (long-run) in‡ation elasticities, i.e., ®=(1 ¡
P
i ½i)=¹¼,e s t i m a t e d
in Section 2, were found to be smaller than one for both eras and all model speci…cations.20
According to these results, the money growth rules in the pre-Volcker and in the post-Volcker
era reveal that money supply ensured the economy to evolve on a saddle stable equilibrium
path. Hence, there is a unique solution of the rational expectations equilibrium of the model,
i.e., the so-called fundamental solution or minimum-state-variable solution (see McCallum,
1999). The absence of non-fundamental solutions, i.e., solutions with extraneous state vari-
ables, implies that ‡uctuations in macroeconomic aggregates could not have been induced by
non-fundamental (sunspot) shocks. This stands in clear contrast to the hypothesis stated by
Clarida et al. (2000), which is based on their …nding that interest rate policy has been passive
(½¼ < 1) in the pre-Volcker era, that the high and volatile in‡ation rates in this era were
due to a monetary policy regime allowing for multiple solutions, including non-fundamental
solutions, and, thus, for self-ful…lling expectations.
Optimal monetary policy Though the money supply rules for pre-Volcker and the Volcker-
Greenspan era do not di¤er with regard to their determinacy implications, they clearly di¤er
by their ability to reduce the volatility of endogenous variables (triggered by fundamental
shocks), which will be demonstrated in the remainder of this section. In order to disclose
the ability of di¤erent money supply rules to stabilize the economy, we consider a central
bank loss function Lt which penalizes the volatility of relevant variables. Following Wood-
ford (2002), we assume that monetary policy aims at maximizing household’s welfare. Given
that we restrict our attention to the model’s local dynamics at the long-run equilibrium,
we apply a second order approximation of the households’ objective (4) at the undistorted
steady state. For this it is implicitly assumed that the distortion arising from monopolistic
competition in the goods market is eliminated in the steady state by an appropriate transfer
scheme of the …scal authority. Further, it is assumed that the central bank sets the long-run
money growth rate equal to one (for example by setting ·¹ =1) ¹ = ¼ =1 ). Based on













20Speci…cally, the long-run in‡ation elasticity never exceeds 0.6.
15The derivation of (20), which is closely related to the procedure in Woodford (2002, chap.
6) or Walsh (2003), can be found in appendix 8.2. We now proceed by deriving the optimal
monetary policy under commitment, implying that the central bank does not re-optimize
each period. To be more precise, we want to derive a simple money supply rule, which is
able to implement the optimal allocation for a timeless perspective; the latter concept being
for example applied in McCallum and Nelson (2000) and Giannoni and Woodford (2002).21
The following proposition summarizes the outcome of the policy problem.
Proposition 2 (Optimal policy) A central bank can implement the optimal monetary pol-
icy under commitment on a saddle stable path by setting the money growth rate according to
b ¹t = ¹¤
¼b ¼t,w i t h ¹¤
¼ ´¡ (² ¡ 1) < 0: (21)
Proof. Using that the equilibrium conditions (17) and (18) are not binding for optimal




















b ¼t ¡ !b yt ¡ ¯b ¼t+1 ¡ Âb Ãt
i¾
:
The …rst order conditions for t>0,g i v e nb y¡b ¼t ¡ Át + Át¡1 =0and ¡!
² b yt + !Át =0 ,c a n




(b yt ¡ b yt¡1)=b ¼t 8t>0 (22)
The cash constraint b mt = b yt and b ¹t = b mt + b ¼t ¡ b mt¡1 leads to the instrument rule b ¹t =
(1 ¡ ²)b ¼t.G i v e n t h a t²>1 (see 12), we can conclude that optimal monetary policy under
commitment can be implemented with a money growth rule featuring a strictly negative
in‡ation elasticity (¹¤
¼ < 0), which, by proposition 1, ensures saddle path stability. ¥
As shown in proposition 2, a central bank can install the optimal allocation under commit-
ment, if it sets the money growth rate contingent on current in‡ation with a negative value
for the in‡ation elasticity, ¹¤
¼ =1¡ ²<0. Applying this particular money supply rule the
central bank exactly implements the so-called targeting rule (22). Alternatively, the optimal
allocation can also be implemented by a forward looking money supply rule.22 The condition
presented in proposition 2 further reveals that a constant money growth rule (¹¼ =0 )c a nb e
optimal in the limiting case where the deterministic distortion, which stems from the average
price mark-up of monopolistically competitive …rms, vanishes (² ! 1). It should, however,
21According to this approach, the central bank behaves as if it has implemented its policy plan in…nite
periods ago implying that the initial period can be neglected.
22For example, when ½' =0a rule satisfying b ¹t =( 1¡ ²)±
¡1
m Etb ¼t+1 is optimal, where ±m is equal to the
stable root X1 of the characteristic polynomial in (19).
16be noted that the so-called Friedman rule, ¹t =1 =¯, violates the condition ¼ =1 ,w h i c h
characterizes the undistorted steady state.23 Nevertheless, the existence of price mark-ups
(²>1) implies that a money supply rule with a negative in‡ation elasticity is more e¢cient
than constant or accommodating (¹¼ > 0) money growth regimes.
In contrast to the case where the nominal interest rate serves as the policy instrument (see
Giannoni and Woodford, 2002, proposition 4), the particular type and the statistical prop-
erties of the exogenous disturbance has no impact on the conditions describing the optimal
money supply. For example, the optimal money supply rule does not depend on ½' and is
unchanged when we allow for productivity shocks instead of cost push shocks. However, when
money demand shock are considered, the particular money supply rule, which implements
the optimal allocation, is not entirely deterministic. As in the case of the optimal interest
rate rules derived in Clarida et al. (1999), optimal money supply would then also depend
on stochastic disturbances, i.e., on the realizations of money demand shocks. In any case,
the central bank does not need to solve for the equilibrium sequences under the targeting
rule (22) to identify the optimal rule for its instrument. This property is not self-evident and
does in general not apply for interest rate rules (see Giannoni and Woodford, 2002). More-
over, an optimal money supply rule under commitment guarantees the economy to evolve on
a saddle stable path (see proposition 1). Thus, it rules out explosiveness and self-ful…lling
expectations, which can easily arise for interest rate rules, which are aimed to implement the
optimal allocation (see Svensson and Woodford, 2003).
The sign restriction for optimal money growth rules in (21) reveals the main di¤erence
between the policy regimes presented in the empirical analysis. While the pre-Volcker era was
associated with a strictly non-negative in‡ation elasticity, Federal Reserve policy in Volcker-
Greenspan era has lead to a signi…cantly negative in‡ation elasticity. Given this clear evi-
dence, we can immediately conclude that the latter regime was more successful in maximizing
welfare and, thus, in stabilizing macroeconomic ‡uctuations induced by fundamental shocks.
5 Transmission of money supply shocks
In this section we aim at revealing the implications of money supply contingency for the
transmission of monetary injections, which are usually analyzed for constant money growth
regimes (¹¼ =0 ). In particular, we derive the implications regarding two often discussed
issues in the literature (see, e.g., Christiano et al., 1997, or Chari et al., 2000), namely, the
existence of a liquidity e¤ect and the persistence of output responses. Disregarding cost push
23The Friedman rule is in fact optimal if a standard cash-constraint applies, Ptct · Mt¡1 +Pt¿t, prices are
‡exible and households and …rms are perfectly competitive such that uc(t)=vl(t)Rt.
17shocks (Ãt =1 ), the generic form of the fundamental solution only features real balances
b mt¡1 and the policy shocks "t as the relevant state variables of the model:
b mt = b yt = ±mb mt¡1 + ±m""t and b ¼t = ±¼mb mt¡1 + ±¼""t: (23)
The coe¢cients ±i with i 2f m; m"; ¼m; ¼"g are determined applying the method of un-
determined coe¢cients (see, e.g., McCallum, 1999). Using the stability condition given in
proposition 1, the following qualitative properties of the coe¢cients in (23) can easily be
derived (see appendix 8.3).
Lemma 1 Suppose that the central banks sets the growth rate of money according to (17)
with ¹¼ < 1. Then the coe¢cients of the fundamental solution (23) are characterized by
0 <± m;±m" < 1 and ±¼m;±¼" > 0.
Hence, an unexpected rise in the money growth rate temporarily leads to higher real balances,
output, and in‡ation rates (@ b mt=@"t = @b yt=@"t = ±m" > 0;@ b ¼t=@"t = ±¼" > 0). The central
relation between money growth rates and the nominal interest rate, which stems from the
consumption Euler equation (18), reads b Rt = ¾Et(b ¹t+1¡b ¼t+1)+Etb ¼t+1. The behavior of the
nominal interest rate thus depends on the way money growth policy depends on the in‡ation
rate. The fundamental solution for the interest rate reveals that a su¢ciently small value for
the in‡ation elasticity is able to ensure the existence of a liquidity e¤ect.
Proposition 3 (Liquidity e¤ect) A shock to the money growth rule, "t > 0,l e a d st oa n
immediate decline in the nominal interest rate (@ b Rt=@"t < 0) if ¹¼ < ¹¼,w i t h¹¼ ´ ¾¡1
¾ < 1.
Proof. Combining (17) and (18) to b Rt = Et [1 + ¾(¹¼ ¡ 1)]b ¼t+1, and applying (23), gives
the solution b Rt =[ 1 + ¾(¹¼ ¡ 1)]±¼m(±m""t + ±mb mt¡1). Further using that ±m" and ±¼m
are strictly positive (see lemma 1), we can conclude that the in‡ation elasticity must be
su¢ciently small, ¹¼ < (¾ ¡ 1)=¾, to ensure @ b Rt=@"t < 0. ¥
The result presented in proposition 3 shows that the likelihood for a money growth rule to
lead to a liquidity e¤ect rises with smaller elasticities ¹¼ a n dw i t hh i g h e rv a l u e sf o rt h ei n v e r s e
of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution ¾. For example, a constant money growth is
su¢cient for a liquidity e¤ect as long as ¾>1. This corresponds to the …nding of Christiano
et al. (1997) in a model with one period preset prices and is qualitatively consistent with
the results in Galí (2001) and Andrés et al. (2002) derived from simulations. Given that
the reactiveness of money growth policy governs the commovement of real balances and the
in‡ation rate, it further has a bearing on the persistence of the output responses to a monetary
injection. In particular, the model predicts that the persistence is raised by higher values for
the in‡ation elasticity. In order to derive this result we use that the persistence of output
18measured by @b yt+1=@b yt equals the stable eigenvalue ±m , as the cash-in-advance constraint
demands output to be equal to real balances.
Proposition 4 (Persistence) T h ep e r s i s t e n c eo ft h eo u t p u tr e s p o n s et oam o n e ys u p p l y
shock rises for larger values for the in‡ation elasticity: @(@b yt+1=@b yt)=@¹¼ = @±m=@¹¼ > 0.
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is strictly positive, as @©(¹¼)=@¹¼ < 0 and @±m=@©(¹¼) < 0 given that ¯>0. ¥
The result presented in proposition 4 can be rationalized as follows. Suppose that an expan-
sionary money growth shock hits the economy. Then real balances and the rate of in‡ation
rises on impact as revealed by the signs of the impact multiplier in lemma 1. Hence, a positive
feedback from in‡ation to the nominal money growth prolongs the time interval required for
real balances to return to the steady state. Consequently, the convergence back to the steady
state is speeded up by a negative in‡ation elasticity.
6C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we argue that Federal Reserve policy can actually be summarized by simple
money supply rules. We provide empirical evidence that the growth rate of non-borrowed
reserves has been set contingent on expected in‡ation rates. Estimates for the pre-Volcker and
the Volcker-Greenspan era reveal that the latter regime has been highly reactive indicated by a
signi…cantly negative in‡ation elasticity, whereas the former regime was in fact associated with
an accommodating money supply (a positive in‡ation elasticity). While this …nding supports
related evidence on simple interest rate rules as well as common wisdom about the relative
performances of the policy regimes, the results cast doubt on the hypothesis that high and
volatile in‡ation rates in the pre-Volcker period were mainly brought about Federal Reserve
interest rate policy, by allowing for self-ful…lling expectations. Considering the underlying
money supply behavior, we show that saddle path stability was never abolished, and that
monetary policy actually di¤ered with regard to its e¤ectiveness to stabilize the economy hit
by fundamental (rather than non-fundamental) shocks. This conclusion is exactly supported
by an analysis of the optimal monetary policy under commitment, which reveals that the
optimal in‡ation elasticity must indeed be negative. On the transmission of money supply
shocks, we further show that with smaller in‡ation elasticities the likelihood of a liquidity
e¤ect rises, while the persistence of output responses declines.
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CPI Inflation (left hand scale)
Nonborrowed Reserves (right hand scale)
Notes: The left hand axis refers to the in‡ation rate and the right hand axis measures the
growth rate of nonborrowed reserves. The scale of the right hand axis has been inverted.
Growth rates are calculated as year-on-year percentage changes.
238 Appendix
8.1 Forward looking money supply rules
In order to demonstrate the robustness of the determinacy condition presented in proposition
1, we consider the following forward looking money growth rule
b mt ¡ ¹¼Etb ¼t+1 = b mt¡1 ¡ b ¼t + "t: (24)


























The characteristic polynomial is given by H(X)=X2 ¡
¯+1+!
!¹¼+¯X + 1
!¹¼+¯,w i t hH(0) =
(!¹¼ + ¯)¡1 and H(1) = !(¹¼ ¡ 1)(!¹¼ + ¯)¡1.T h u s , ¹¼ > ¡¯=! implies H(0) > 0 and
H(1) < 0 if ¹¼ < 1, such that there is exactly one stable root between zero and one. For
¹¼ < ¡¯=!,w ek n o wt h a tH(0) < 0 and H(1) > 0 if ¹¼ < 1, implying that saddle path
stability is ensured by ¹¼ < 1.
8.2 Derivation of the central bank’s loss function
In this appendix we derive a linear-quadratic approximation of the average of households’
objective u(ct)+
R 1
0 v(ljt)dj at the undistorted steady state. The derivation closely follows
Woodford (2002, chap. 6) and Walsh (2003). Let e Xt = Xt ¡ X and b Xt =l o gXt ¡ logX,
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where O(Xn) summarizes terms of order equal or higher than n and kak denotes a bound
on the amplitude of exogenous disturbances. Using e ct ¼ c
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24Combining e lt =
R 1
0
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t + varib yit:


































and using vl(l)=uc(c)=w=Ã = mc=Ã =( 1¡ ­), where ­ measures the distortion due to
monopolistic competition, we can collect terms to
u(ct) ¡ v(lt) ¼ u(c) ¡ v(l)+uc(c)y
·
­ ¢ b yt ¡
1
2
[¾ + # ¡ ­(1 + #)] b y2






w h e r ew eu s e dct = yt. Assuming that ­ ! 0, which can be interpreted as a …scal authority
being able to avoid the monopolistic distortion by an appropriate transfer system, gives
u(ct) ¡ v(lt) ¼ u(c) ¡ v(l) ¡ uc(c)y
1
2




²¡1vari (logyit ¡ logy):
25Further using that the demand function yit =( Pit=Pt)
¡² yt implies vari logyit = ²2vari logPit
and that
P1
t=0 ¯tvari logpit ¼ Â¡1 P1
t=0 ¯t¼2






















where we used that ! ´ Â(# + ¾) and ¼ =1 .
8.3 Proof of lemma 1
In order to establish the claims made in the lemma, we apply the equilibrium conditions given
in de…nition 1 and use the method of undetermined coe¢cients (see, e.g., McCallum, 1999).
The aggregate supply curve (16) together with the general solution form (23) immediately
leads to the following four conditions for the coe¢cients ±i with i 2f m; m"; ¼m; ¼"g
±¼m ¡ ¯±¼m±m ¡ !±m =0;± m +( 1¡ ¹¼)±¼m ¡ 1=0 ; (25)
±¼" ¡ ¯±¼m±m" ¡ !±m" =0;± m" +( 1¡ ¹¼)±¼" ¡ 1=0 : (26)
Eliminating ±¼m in the equations in (25) yields a quadratic equation in ±m, which equals the
characteristic polynomial in (19), featuring a exactly one root between zero and one if ¹¼ < 1
(see proposition 1). Given that this inequality is satis…ed, such that 0 <± m = X1 < 1 holds,
the following expression, which is derived from the equations in (26), reveals that ±m" also
lies between zero and one 0 <± m" =[ 1+¯(1 ¡ ±m)+!(1 ¡ ¹¼)]¡1 < 1. Therefore, we
can conclude that ±¼" = 1¡±m"
1¡¹¼ > 0 and ±¼m = 1¡±m
1¡¹¼ > 0, which completes the proof of the
lemma. ¥
26